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was meandering toward ending the war in afghanistan and allowing the pentagon and you have to remember when you're looking at the pentagon, you're looking at an institution that has the fine motor skills of a dinosaur. it takes the pentagon a long time to put something together, such as a timetable for withdrawal. all obama has to do, and i know it is not that simple, but i would look at the gorbachev experience. he came in 1985, he gave a speech in 1986 denouncing afghanistan as a bleeding wound. he had secretly told schultz at the military was going to get one year to turn it around. and that they wouldn't be able to. he announced a timetable, and then he was gone and 89. we need to do something similar, the military had its chances, we had 11 commanders in afghanistan in 11 years, take a look at this book by the general, which devotes a lot of attention to this. that is not a war where we can be successful. that is not in the military we have. there is no military that has ever been successful with counterinsurgency. not only that, but they have an ally in pakistan where we survived with bil
into words and the the war afghanistan and he's allowing the pentagon and you have to remember when you're looking at the pentagon you are looking at an institution that has defined motor skills and a dinosaur. if you take the pentagon a long time to put something together all but obama has to do and i know it isn't this simple but i would look at the gorbachev experience. he came out of 1985 he gave the secret speech in 1986 denouncing afghanistan to his fellow bureau colleagues as a bleeding wound he had the moxie secretly tell shultz we were getting out that the military was going to get one year to turnaround and the wouldn't feel to. they announced a timetable and they were gone. we need to do something similar. they had their chances we had 11 commanders and afghanistan in 11 years take a look at thomas rex book the generals that devotes a lot of attention to this isn't a war we can be successful and the kind of military we have. there is no military that had ever been successful in the counterinsurgency where they have a sanctuary. not only did it have a sanctuary but in outlinin
. but the second point i think our first of all the pentagon didn't show you any video. that's bad puerto rico. and the percentage of the weapons that were smart weapons and the first gulf war more than anything the iraqis had was remarkably small compared to the impression the pentagon gave in their military briefings where the only showed pictures of smart bombs and missiles and things flying through windows. there was a very tiny percentage of the actions actually expended. so i don't think that this was so much a revolution of military affairs as a vivid demonstration as you pointed out on just how proficient the united states was in waging a war especially against a less proficient adversary but it was a more philosophical way and that is and the ultimate goal of the conflict was a political goal so there for the military planning involves both smart and some weapons and they were designed with a traditional military conclusion which in truth wasn't revolutionary at all which was getting the enemy to do what we wanted. so i can't see the revolutionary military affairs. i am getting a sign
the organization would fallen apart. think about any organization. i work until the pentagon it would have made it better. so -- [laughter] we realize the you have to go after the people who do the work. the people who do logistics, communications, pass information, build car bombs, communicate. so you to take them out. so we came out with the strategy. and philadelphia love this. it's like rocky and apollo. we're going hit them in the midsection and hit them a lot. from august of 2004 when we did 18 rides, two years later, same month, same force, same fight we were doing 300 raids a month. that's ten a night. now, if you stop and say you ten a night. that's a lot. that's impressive. that means every raid guy on the force is going a raid at least one every night. every pilot is flying one or two raids every night. and these raids are not patrols inspect is not a -- these are going in the door somebody is getting shot. extraordinary. and to do that, though, you can't use previous systems. one you have to be able to bring in the intelligence on the industrial scale. you have to get to the point w
is taken out does it get worse? i worked at the pentagon, it would have been a lot better. we realize you got to go after the people who do the work, people who do logistics', communication, pass information, build car bombs, communicate, take those out so we came up with a strategy. i used to tell people it is like rocky balboa and apollo creed. we hit them in the midsection and it them aloft. from august of 20 . from august of 2004 when we did 18 raids, we doing 300 raids a month, ten a night. every raid guy on the force is going on one raid every night. every pilot is flying one or two raids every night. these raids are not patrols. these are going in the door, someone is getting shot. extraordinary. to do that you can't use previous systems. you have to bring in intelligence on an industrial scale, we got to the point where instead of plastic bags of information on a target we would start to exploit their computers and biometric data, it would be pumped back to west virginia from the target to see if we ever had that person before and if we ever had any dealings with him, we would mov
but the second two points the pentagon did not show you any video the percentage of footprints that were smart well infinitely more than what the iraqis had was small compared to the impression the pentagon gave we're the only showed pictures, that was a tiny percentage. so i don't think this was a revolution as you pointed out just how proficient united states was in waging war with a less proficient adversary. in the more philosophical and fundamental way that the ultimate goal of the conflict was a political goal so the military planning with the air war were designed with a traditional military conclusion which in truth was not revolutionary at all so i cannot see it in revolutionary affairs i do see we're running at a time by one to give him a chance to comment. >> as i alluded to the revolutionary of military affairs the something that came at the time goldwater nichols was passed to join the military and was all that was talked about back in the '80s and what it meant to me is finally, coming at a vietnam , we had thinkers in the military said said it worked through what it takes to wag
was also inducted into the hall of heroes at the pentagon and honored with a parade. since then meyer has raised more than a million dollars to help send the children of wounded marines to college. and finally, as you have all seen, he is the author of "into the fire: a firsthand account of the most extraordinary battle in the afghan war." leading authorities is very proud to exclusively represent dakota meyer, and now i want to show you a video to hear more about dakota and his story. thank you. ♪ >> it's kind of frustrating because, you know, everyone wants to get an interview about the worst day of your life. >> it was a straightforward mission that then-21-year-old sergeant dakota meyer had been assigned that day. meyer waited anxiously by the vehicles as his team began their parol of the village on foot. as they approached, all hell l broke loose. more than 50 insurgents fired from positions on mountains surrounding the valley and from within the village. back at the vehicles, meyer heard the firing and could see into the valley. the volume of fire increased, and the radio traffic
organization, if the key person gets taken out, does it really get worse? i worked in the pentagon, it would have made it better. [laughter] so we realized you've really got to go after the people who do logistics, communications, pass information, build car bombs, communicate. you've got to take those out. and so we came up with a strategy, and i know philadelphia will love this, but i used to tell people it's like rocky balboa and apollo creed. we're going to hit them in the midsection, and we're going to hit them a lot. so from august 2004 when we did 18 raids, two years later same force, same fight we were doing 300 raids a month. that's ten a nightment now, if you stop and you say, well, ten a night, that's a lot, that's impress e. that means every raid guy on the force is going on a raid at least one raid every night. every pilot's flying one or two raids every night. and these raids are not patrols. this is not a foot -- these are going in the door, somebody's getting shot. extraordinary. and to do that, though, you can't use previous systems. one, you've got to be able to bring in th
authorities. he served for three decades as an army special forces officer and top pentagon official in july 2001 he assumed the duties of military assistant to secretary rumsfeld and worked daily with the secretary for the next five and a half years and then upon retirement from the army he continued at the pentagon as deputy assistant secretary of defense. please join me in welcoming steve bucci. steve? [applause] >> let me add my welcome to all of you. i think we're going to have a real treat this morning. as john mentioned, i'm a special forces officer by profession, and so this area is near and dear to my heart because this is kind of what we do, or did. they don't let me do it anymore. [laughter] i mentioned to max when he came in a little historical artifact in that when i was a cadet at west point, i bought a book that had just been published. it was a two-volume set. it was called war in the shadows, the guerrilla in history by robert asprague. that book from 1975 til now really has been the sort of benchmark for this kind of historical review of this subject area. that's a long tim
alv vast network of oldot colleagues throughout the pentagon bureaucracy. he's reaching out to them.s he deliberately forms a back v channel. he cultivates this woman in the white house named megyn to o'sullivan who is president bush's every chief adviser in the national security council. he sees she's kind of wavering. l security council and seized she is wavering and they're talking on the phone practically every day. this is outrageous. a three-star general from fort wet weather worsened talking on the phone every day with the senior advisor to the president of the united states general casey you is a four-star general commanding troops he says we only need one more brigade so those are arguments why it isn't enough so when it comes, by the way it is not paula bridewell but strictly professional. but subverting the chain of command he always has been off the reservation guy to do what is necessary here but at the same time a civilian analyst used to teach history he rode a steady advocating the surge at the american enterprise institute. said to get this into the warehouse into t
, first of all, the pentagon didn't show you any video of things that missed. that's bad pr. and the percentage of weapons that were smart weapons in the first gulf war while infinitely more than anything the iraqis had was remarkably small compared to the impression the pentagon gave in their military briefings where they'd only show pictures of smart bombs and smart missiles and things flying through windows. that was a very, very tiny percentage of the munitions actually expended. so i don't think this was so much a revolution in military affairs so much as a vivid demonstration, as you point out, of just how proficient the united states was in waging war especially against a less proficient adversary. but it also was military affairs in a more philosophical, fundamental way, and that is claus wits still has a vote here, and the ultimate goal of the conflict was a political goal and, therefore, the military planning and the air war being a classic case in point of this were designed with a traditional military conclusion which in truth was not revolutionary at all which w
a vast network of old colleagues throughout the pentagon bureaucracy. is reaching out to them. he deliberately forms a back channel. he cultivates this woman in the white house named meghan o'sullivan who was president bush's chief adviser on iraq in the national security council. he sees she's waving from the policy, he cultivates her. they're talking on the phone practically every day. now, picture this. this is kind of average. his petraeus, a three-star general in fort leavenworth. is talking on the phone everyday with the senior advisor to the president of united states. she will be asking him, general casey who is a four-star general actually commanding troop in iraq if general casey as we only need one more brigade, what do you think with an petraeus would muster these arguments that she could funnel to her seniors on why this really isn't enough. so, you know, when he comes to washington and meets in restaurants -- by the way, this is not, this is strictly professional. can you imagine, this is someone, essentially subverting the chain of command, getting his own views acr
to get this into the warehouse into the pentagon to some of these subordinates in iraq so basically by the time the trade is becomes the commander everything is lined up to impose a strategy with the united states government this is not a coincidence, it is very exclusively coordinated. what does he do? one thing that is already starting to have been is this is a pivotal moment serial iraq and allied with al qaeda, it goes several steps to fire their getting upset and one to break with al qaeda and there is a criminal named shawn mcfarland to canada this group to switch to our side to fight but the trieste's realizes what is going on to apply this struck the country and does this by setting up a program called the sons of iraq. he pays them out of the commander discretionary fund. with a neighborhood watch those who have been shooting at american's two weeks earlier and at the same time he needs to go after the militia prime minister maliki told the prime minister's day at of sadr city now in some kind of alliance he just send these guys in and does not wait for approval. there is a
and a half years, and then upon retirement from the army continued at the pentagon is deputy assistant secretary of defense, homeland defense, and america security affairs but please join me in welcoming steve bucci. [applause] >> let me add my welcome to all of you. i think you're going to have a real treat this morning, as john mentioned him on a special forces officer by profession, and so this area is near and dear to my heart. this is kind of what we do. they don't let me do it anymore. i mentioned to max when he came in a little historical artifact, and that when i was a cadet at west point i bought a book that had just been published, a two volume set. it was called war in the shadows, the guerrilla in history. that book from 1975 intel now, really has been sort of benchmark for this kind of historical review of the subject area. that's a long time for a book to keep that sort of position. well, with apologies, i think his book is being replaced now, and max has done that with this book which is on sale outside, "invisible armies," he i think you set a new benchmark for the subj
the enemy didn't have. but the second two points i think at that first of all the pentagon didn't show you any video of things it missed. that's bad pr. and the percentage of weapons that were smart weapons in the first gulf war while infinitely anything more than the iraqis had was remarkably small. compared to the impression the pentagon gave in the military briefings where they only showed pictures of smart bombs and smart missiles seen flying through windows. that was a very, very tiny percentage of the munitions actually expend. so i don't think this is so much a revolution of military affairs so much as a vivid demonstration as you pointed out as just a proficient at united states was in waging war, especially against a less proficient adversary. but it also was a military affairs, and that is the ultimate goal of the conflict was a political goal. and so, therefore, the military planning that involve both smart and dumb weapons in a war where design with a traditional military conclusion, which in truth was not revolution at all which was getting the enemy to do what you wanted. so
Search Results 0 to 15 of about 16 (some duplicates have been removed)

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